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Party Ideology and Clientelistic Linkage∗
Eitan Tzelgov† Yi-Ting Wang‡
Abstract
How does parties’ ideology affect their linkage strategies? While scholars maintain that
economically right wing parties are more clientelistic, there has been no systematic
study testing this argument. We examine the conservative ideology-clientelism nexus
with multi-level quantitative analyses of parties’ clientelistic appeals. Our analysis re-
veals a robust, yet nuanced relationship between ideology and clientelism. Specifically,
right wing parties are more clientelistic than left wing parties, but only with regard
to providing broad economic rents to clients. In contrast, economically conservative
parties are not more likely to engage in individual targeted clientelism. Moreover,
parties’ ties with economic interests mediate the relationship between ideology and
clientelism. Finally, the association between parties’ linkage to business interests and
rents clientelism is attenuated by country-level economic liberalism.
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work. Th authors wish to thank John Gerring, Kenneth Greene,
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1 Introduction
While programmatic politics, in which politicians offer broad policy packages, has frequently
been seen as the normatively most adequate form of democratic party competition, schol-
ars have realized for some time it is not the only game politicians and voters may play.
The literature has pointed to clientelism as an alternative to the programmatic mode of
accountability strategy (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In contrast to political competition
characterized by parties providing programmatic platforms of policy bundles, clientelism
involves the provision of targeted goods or services by politicians to individuals or small
groups of voters, in exchange for their support. While the benefits offered to voters in a
programmatic accountability relationship are broad public policies, voters in a clientelistic
relationship expect to obtain targeted benefits delivered only to party supporters.
To understand why parties tend to rely on a particular accountability strategy to at-
tract votes, scholars have examined the effects of various features of party organization
(Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011; Kitschelt and Wang, 2013), electoral competitiveness (Dixit
and Londregan, 1996; Geddes, 1991; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Schady, 2000), political
institutions (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1995; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Ordeshook, 1995), levels
of development (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013), and democratic experience
(Keefer, 1992). While the existing research has provided ideas about the conditions under
which parties invest in either programmatic or clientelistic strategy, there has been little
discussion on whether and how parties combine these two linkage mechanisms. Is diversi-
fying and utilizing both linkage mechanisms a winning strategy for some parties? Under
what ideological conditions are parties more likely to establish clientelistic networks? Ex-
tant findings imply that right wing parties may be associated with higher levels of clientelism
(Middlebrook, 2000; Hicks and Swank, 1992). However, scholars have not reached a system-
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atic understanding of this association, and thus, important and general questions remain
unanswered. First, why is right wing politics more likely to be combined with clientelistic
exchanges? Second, are all types of clientelistic goods similarly compatible with right wing
ideology? Third, is this association contingent on certain structural conditions?
To answer these questions, we first address the challenging task of defining and mea-
suring clientelism (Hicken, 2011). Thus, we follow Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), who
move beyond a narrow definition of clientelism,1 to a definition incorporating the provision
of targeted and conditional economic favors by parties. We argue that parties, who are
constrained by their (economic) ideology, can provide different types of clientelistic goods
to attract different groups of voters. Potential voters vary in their preferences for types of
clientelism. We therefore disaggregate clientelism into two categories, based on the type
of the clientelistic benefit. Specifically, we separate rents (economic efforts aimed at small
groups of voters and economic interests) from private clientelism (narrow and direct efforts,
aimed at unorganized individual voters).2
Further, we posit that ideology and clientelism are not mutually exclusive (Singer and
Kitschelt, 2011; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013). Rather, ideology can serve vote-maximizing
parties to generate affinity with voters/clients (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). This affinity
enables clientelistic transactions, but the type of transaction is conditional on the specific
combination of party ideology and voter group. Specifically, it allows left wing parties to
target low-income voters with narrow based clientelism, and right wing parties to focus on
providing rents to economic interests, especially when these parties enjoy strong contacts
with business associations. However, due to parties’ vote-maximization strategy and the
1That is, a definition capturing only dyadic exchanges between the individual voter and the party.
2A full discussion of rents is beyond the scope of this paper. Rents are created when the state restricts the
operations of the market in favor of its clients (Hutchcroft, 1997; Krueger, 1974). When these restrictions,
such as licensing some aspect of economic activity, providing a contract to a specific firm or intervening with
bureaucracy to obtain a favor for a firm, are contingent and direct, they fall under the rubric of clientelism.
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fact that unorganized, low-income voters are ‘cheap’, right wing parties utilize a cross-class
coalition strategy, in which they also approach low-income voters with narrow clientelistic
appeals (Gibson, 1992; Luna, 2010). Moving to structural conditions at the country level,
we argue that liberal and transparent economic environments limit the ability of right wing
parties to utilize their connections with business for clientelistic transactions.
We test our argument with data provided by the Democratic Accountability and Linkage
Project (DALP), which is the most comprehensive cross-national dataset of parties’ pro-
grammatic and clientelistic strategies. We utilize hierarchical models to examine the effects
of parties’ characteristics, as well as country-level political and economic features. The anal-
ysis provides support for our theoretical expectations. First, right wing parties are more
likely to employ clientelistic linkage tactics, but only when it comes to benefits provided
to economic interests. In contrast, the political ideology of a party is a non-factor when it
comes to private clientelism, which targets individuals more directly. Second, the results
show that much of the relationship between right wing ideology and clientelism is mediated
by the fact that these parties have strong ties to business associations. Finally, as expected,
the party-business nexus has a weaker effect on clientelism in more transparent and liberal
economies.
These findings have clear implications for the study of party politics, electoral competi-
tion, and clientelism. By disaggregating the concept of clientelism and demonstrating that
some facets of clientelism go hand in hand with right wing ideology while others do not, this
analysis offers a novel explanation for a central feature of electoral competition, one that has
yet to be studied in a comprehensive fashion. While demonstrating that there exists a rela-
tionship between business and politics is not novel, the analysis highlights the mediating role
of business interests, as they serve as a channel of voter recruitment for economically con-
servative parties. Finally, establishing the contingent effects of economic openness has clear
4
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implications on the interaction between state level contextual factors and parties’ linkage
effort.
2 Variation within Accountability Mechanisms
The concept of democratic accountability encompasses the relationship between voters as
the principals and politicians as the agents. In election, citizens can cast their votes based
on the linkage mechanism by which politicians attempt to attract the electorate. Based
on the experience of advanced democracies, the existing research on party competition has
assumed ‘policies’ and ideologies – the broad principles underlying policy positions – as the
most conventional appeal politicians offer. In this conventional programmatic accountability
relationship, parties respond to electorates by advertising and implementing policies that
align with the interests of a subset of the constituency. Voters then compare the policies
proffered by parties and make their decision. Under programmatism, policy packages are
usually in the form of large-scale ‘club’ or collective goods. Importantly, the provisions of
such goods are not contingent on citizens’ voting decisions or their ties to parties.
In contrary to the programmatic linkage strategy, voters in a clientelistic relationship
expect to obtain a particular party-sponsored benefit targeting potential supporters only.
The distributed benefits are tailored to a specific constituency and may take a variety of
forms, such as consumer goods, preferential access to social policy, and influence over the
application of economic regulations. Clientelistic exchange presupposes that parties are
able to identify voter groups that would be amenable to the provision of benefits, and
have the organizational infrastructure necessary to facilitate the distribution and delivery of
goods. In addition, parties may also have the capacity to monitor the voting behavior of the
5
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beneficiaries.
While the distinction between programmatic and clientelistic politics is generally clear,3
it is insufficient for the purpose of disentangling the relationship between parties’ ideology
and clientelistic tactics. Therefore, following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), who move
beyond the conceptualization of clientelism as encapsulating only direct, dyadic relationships
between individual clients and patrons, we posit that economic goods (rents) that are aimed
at groups of individuals and organized economic interests, and can be withheld from other
groups but not from group members, fall under the rubric of clientelism. Our motivation for
differentiating between rents and private clientelism hinges on the assumption that various
social groups have demands for different types of clientelistic exchange. For example, as
individuals become more aﬄuent and well-organized, their demand for private gifts should
be lower than that of low-income, isolated voters. Second, it is evident that parties’ economic
ideology is intertwined with the type of social groups it can attract, and thus with the choice
of a specific clientelistic tactic. Thus, a measure that does not differentiate between various
types of clientelism would not enable us to unpack the relationship between political ideology
and clientelism.
We break the overall concept of clientelism into two mutually exclusive categories. The
first one, which we dub rent clientelism (RC), captures a situation where a political party
commits to change/restrict the operation of the market in favor of the client. These rents can
include the provision of contracts, regulatory codes, and business environments that favor the
clients as a group. These inducements are given directly to groups of citizens or businesses in
order to get their votes, as well as their employees’. The second category, private clientelism
(PC) is based on direct, narrow exchange between parties and unorganized individual voters.
3See Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the differences between clientelistic and programmatic policies.
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These, for example, can be food, gifts, jobs, or access to public services4.
3 Parties’ Ideology and the Types of Clientelistic Tac-
tics
The relationship between parties’ ideology and clientelism has not been studied systemat-
ically in the literature.5 Scholars have either solely focused on one linkage mechanism, or
tended to assume that parties face a trade-off between adopting programmatism or engaging
in clientelistic effort. Indeed, scholars have pointed out due to the different features of ide-
ological and clientelistic linkage strategies, it is difficult for parties to combine both appeals
(Kitschelt, 2000; Singer and Kitschelt, 2011).
Our approach is different, since we view parties as agents trying to maximize votes using
both programmatic and clientelistic linkages. Clientelistic exchanges demand resources from
the patron in terms of recruiting brokers, approaching clients and providing the material
goods. In order to maximize votes, we assume parties will allocate a substantive part of
their clientelistic appeals to target their ‘core’ group of voters.6 Our definition of ‘core’ is
broad, and is related to the concept of ‘affinity’ as used by Schady (2000, 289):“[A]ffinity
could include voter i ’s perception of the incumbent’s character, or the ideological proximity
between voter i and the incumbent.” Thus, ideological proximity serves as one of the ele-
ments that generate a sense of affinity between patron and client, and increases the efficiency
of the clientelistic transaction. Indeed, as Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) argue, program-
4In the Data and Variables section we outline this demarcation in terms of measurement.
5See Middlebrook (2000), who examines right wing Latin-American parties, and Hicks and Swank (1992).
6Note that this does not imply that ‘swing’ voters are not part of parties’ calculus. The rich literature
debating whether parties target ‘core’ of ‘swing’ voters finds that both mechanisms are in play.
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matic and clientelistic politics are not mutually exclusive. Seen through these lenses, ideology
serves as a facilitator of clientelistic exchange, as it enhances a “party’s advantage over its
competitors at swaying voters in a group with offers of particularistic benefits.”(Dixit and
Londregan, 1996, 1134)
Ideological affinity therefore facilitates clientelistic exchange by allowing parties to effi-
ciently target voter groups.7 A left wing party that supports redistribution would find it
easier to form a clientelistic relationship with low-income voters. On the other hand, an
economically conservative party will be hard pressed to establish clientelistic exchanges with
poor voters. Similarly, in general, left wing parties will find it difficult to establish clientelis-
tic networks with groups of aﬄuent voters. Thus, ideology will play a pivotal role in parties’
calculus regarding whom to target.
This argument is supported by the data; we find a negative correlation (r = −0.53) be-
tween parties’ economic position and whether they attempt to attract poor voters, implying
that left parties target poor voters to a higher extent. We also find a strong positive (r = 0.5)
relationship between right wing ideology and the targeting of rich voters with clientelistic
practices.
Following the distinction made in the previous section between different clientelistic ben-
efits, we argue that parties face another important choice. This entails selecting the type
of clientelistic goods to provide to voters. Parties can provide prospective voters with PC
goods such as gifts, jobs, or preferential access to medical treatments. Alternatively, they
can provide RC such as government contracts, or preferable applications of regulations that
would benefit a group of supporters. Generally, parties are much more likely to engage
7 Stokes (2005) emphasizes the futility of targeting ideological voters since they would have voted for
the party even in the absence of clientelism. However as Cox (2006); Nichter (2010) note, parties also use
clientelistic inducements to mobilize their supporters and increase turnout among ideological voters, and
thus, clientelistic effort is at least marginally helpful with ideological voters.
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voters who are less well-off with PC tactics. This is because these voters are in need of
day-to-day assistance rather than broad economic benefits. In addition, poor voters are less
likely to be organized in formal business networks, and thus the use of rents may not be a
viable commodity in the party-voter exchange. In contrast, well-off voters have demands for
clientelistic tactics that move beyond overcoming daily hardships. In addition, these voters
are better organized, and thus offering rents could attract a larger number of supporters.
To preliminarily assess the degree to which this argument is consistent with the data,
Table 1 presents the bi-variate correlations between types of clientelism and targeted groups.
Inspection of this table in isolation would lead to the conclusion that both types of clientelistic
appeals are correlated with targeting of both groups. However, these relationships do not
take into account the overall associations among types of clientelism. Once we examine the
partial correlations in Table 2, it becomes evident that once the variance of PC is purged,
the relationship between RC and targeting of the poor is negative. Similarly, controlling for
RC demonstrates that the relationship between PC and targeting of the rich is negative.
This preliminary examination supports the argument. To reiterate, because of differences in
the demands of different social groups, parties choose the type of clientelism strategically,
using mostly RC to target the rich, and PC to target the poor.
Table 1: Correlations: group targeting
and clientelistic appeal
Poor Rich
Rent Clientelism 0.24 0.26
Private Clientelism 0.39 0.16
Table 2: Partial correlations: group tar-
geting and clientelistic appeal
Poor rich
Rent Clientelism -0.27 0.26
Private Clientelism 0.41 -0.16
Thus far we have argued that parties’ ideology affects the affinity between patron and
client, and thus the degree to which parties target certain social groups. In addition, our
contention is that there exists a relationship between the type of the clientelistic appeal
used by the patron and the socio-economic class of clients. Combining the two parts of the
9
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argument might lead to the conclusion that left wing parties are more clientelistic when it
comes to the use of PC, and right wing parties are more clientelistic in terms of RC. However,
there are a number of reasons to believe that the association between left wing ideology and
PC might not be as robust as the relationship between right wing ideology and RC. First,
poor voters have been shown to be essential to the political economy of clientelistic appeals
in a variety of qualitative, formal, and empirical literature (Baland and Robinson, 2012;
Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Calvo and Murrilo, 2004; Chubb, 1982; Malagoni, Diaz-Cayeros
and Este`vez, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). While the exact causal mechanisms may differ,
scholars agree that the ‘price’ of these voters is relatively low, and thus they serve as an
easy target for parties. Given parties’ limited resources, all parties are expected to devote
resources to utilizing PC to attract poor voting blocs.
Second, vote-maximizing parties may need to expand beyond their ‘core’ constituencies.
Based on the size of these constituencies, economically conservative parties have a stronger
incentive than left parties to create cross-class coalitions, because the sheer size of their ‘core’
constituency is small relative to left parties’ ‘core’ supporters (Gibson, 1992). Conservative
parties will therefore also use PC to attract less well-off voters. These attempts are part
of a linkage segmentation (Luna, 2010). According to this theory, conservative parties can
use a two-pronged electoral strategy, whereby they maintain their ideological affinity with
upper-class voters, while constructing clientelistic networks with poor voters. However, the
left wing parallel of this bifurcated strategy –targeting left leaning voters with ideology and
right leaning voters with RC –is not a preferred strategy for left parties. There are a number
of reasons for this: First, as noted, left wing parties’ constituency tends to be larger than
that of right wing parties, and therefore the creation of a cross-class coalition is less of a
necessity. Second, establishing clientelistic relationships with right leaning voters is more
costly (when compared to the ‘price’ of poor voters). In conclusion, both the size of ‘core’
10
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constituencies and their price dictate that right wing parties can offer clientelistic benefits
that go beyond their ‘core’ constituency, but left parties cannot.8 Bearing this discussion in
mind, we expect that the relationship between right wing ideology and RC to be a robust
one. On the other hand, we expect the relationship between ideological propensity and PC
to be weak. These expectations are formalized in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Right wing parties should use more Rent Clientelism than left wing parties.
Hypothesis 2: There should not be a relationship between ideology and Private Clientelism.
4 The Effect of Party Organization and Economic In-
stitutions
Parties have to rely on intermediaries to target and transfer particularistic inducements to
voters (Koter, 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012). Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) have found that civic
associations can serve as intermediaries, because they can coordinate members and establish
group consensus, and their “special interest” character is likely to make them more amenable
to engage with clientelistic political parties. In addition, the network structure of organized
groups can assume the burden of transmitting benefits to the targeted constituencies and
possibly monitoring opportunistic voter conduct. Overall, civic associations enable the pro-
vision of particularistic benefits to members of organized, internally networked groups “in
8In Appendix 4 we offer a statistical test of the implications of this argument. We find that left wing
parties tend to target only their loyalists (more likely to be poor), while right wing parties are more likely
to target both loyalists and strategic voters. In addition, left wing parties use PC to attract these loyalists,
but right wing parties are likely to utilize both PC and RC to appeal to loyalists as well as strategic voters.
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bulk” at minimum costs.9
While a variety of civic associations can be utilized for clientelistic politics, business
associations have an affinity with right wing ideology. That is, business associations may
sympathize with right wing parties’ ideological promises while being amenable to the provi-
sion of group-based directed benefits. In addition, these associations have the organizational
capacities to help implement clientelistic transactions. Extensive and regular ties to busi-
ness associations provide right wing parties with an efficient venue that can be used to
distribute broad clientelistic goods to groups of voters. Thus, in many cases of right wing
RC, the mechanism enabling the exchange is not direct, but transmitted by a network or-
ganization.10 Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that right parties’ ties to business
associations mediates the use of RC strategies is proposed:
Hypothesis 3: Right wing parties are more likely to rely on rent clientelism when they have
built ties with business associations to facilitate clientelistic exchange. That is, the posi-
tive relationship between parties’ right wing ideology and rent clientelistic effort is mediated
through their linkages to business groups.
Finally, we expect the effects of ties to economic associations on parties’ RC use to be
conditional on countries’ general regulatory environment. While transparency varies across
different clientelistic and programmatic practices, democratic norms dictate that in general,
clientelistic linkage practices are less open to scrutiny than their programmatic counterparts.
9In a sense, business leaders’ role in these exchanges is akin to that of a broker in Stokes et al. (2013),
but they do not pose the same level of informational problems as brokers in Stokes et al.’s account.
10The DALP questionnaire asks only about votes as the commodity received by the party in the clientelistic
exchange. Thus, we are unable to test the degree to which other important forms of support, such as financial
contributions and bribes, constitute a part of the party-business nexus. With regards to votes, there are
ample examples of this type of relationship in a variety of economic sectors (Baland and Robinson, 2012;
Bendix, 1964; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999; Scheiner, 2007).
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As Singer and Kitschelt (2011); Stokes et al. (2013); Wantchekon (2003) have argued, clien-
telistic competition works better when legislation is vague that allows wide discretion and
particularistic implementation. Similarly, clientelism becomes less effective when patrons’
ability to monopolize economic resources is weaker, allowing a higher degree of competition
(Medina and Stokes, 2007). From the demand-side point of view, in a less liberalized and
transparent setting, where the state takes a more active role in the mobilization and alloca-
tion of economic resources, electorate tend to find clientelistic network an important channel
to get side-payments. On the other hand, if the economic process follows generalized rules
and is based on impersonally institutionalized procedures, citizens do not expect to get par-
ticularistic benefits. Furthermore, in a transitional or newly-liberalized economy, the state
can take the opportunity of economic reforms to patronize key economic groups (Shleifer and
Treisman, 2001; Snyder, 1999). Under such conditions, members of business associations,
who share the parties’ right wing ideology, can obtain access to contracts or preferential
applications of regulatory rules through clientelistic exchange. That is, in less-liberalized or
transitional settings, right wing parties have greater chances to combine both clientelistic
and ideological effort to attract business groups. Based on this, a hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between parties’ ties to business associations and rent
clientelistic effort is strengthened in countries where the economic regulations are less liberal.
5 Illustrative Cases
Below we present two motivating cases that serve to illustrate the main points of the theo-
retical argument. Specifically, the Taiwanese and Turkish cases demonstrate the importance
13
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of ties between right wing ideology and business interests as a facilitator of RC exchange, the
relevance of economic transparency to clientelistic exchanges, and the ability of right wing
parties to utilize a bifurcated, cross-class linkage strategy. The article then proceeds to the
empirical testing sections.
5.1 Taiwan
Since the 1990s, democratic elections in Taiwan have been characterized by a stable pattern
of confrontations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP). Since democratization, DPP has promoted several policies of welfare state expan-
sion, including universal health insurance, subsidized housing, and universal pensions (Lin,
2006). KMT takes a more right wing stance. It initiated economic liberalization in the late
1980s, and pushed for free trade agreements, especially those with China in the late 2000s.
Clientelism has also constituted an important strategy of KMT.11 In terms of PC, KMT has
retained extensive broker systems established in the authoritarian era, which have remained
resilient after democratization (Bosco, 1994; Wang and Kurzman, 2007). Utilizing the exten-
sive local networks, the distribution of targeted services, consumer goods, and small amounts
of money has constituted an important electoral strategy, particularly in areas with large
agricultural populations (Chang and Lu, 2011; Wang, 2004). With regard to RC, KMT’s
capacity to combine the appeals of both right wing ideology and rent clientelism partly orig-
inated in its enormous financial resources and the process of economic liberalization.12 Since
11Based on the DALP data, KMT was rated as 6.35 on the rent clientelism scale. Overall, the rent
clientelism indicator has a mean of 4.8 and a standard deviation of 1.52. In 2009, Taiwan had per capita
GDP (PPP) of USD 32,000 and Polity score of 9.8. According to the DALP dataset, the average rent
clientelism ratings for parties in countries with per capita GDP between USD 32,000 - USD 35,000 or Polity
score above 9 are 3.12 or 4.39, respectively.
12KMTs fortune mainly comes from its party-owned enterprises (POEs) as a legacy of its single-party
authoritarian rule. In 1998, the net assets of POEs were still over NTD 200 billion (around USD 6.5 billion),
accounting for more than 2% of GNP (Matsumoto, 2002)
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the late 1980s, utilizing the opportunities of privatizing state-owned enterprises, deregular-
izing certain industries, and legalizing the POEs, KMT was able to patronize key business
groups (Chang, 2008). For example, allowing selected key firms to operate in the newly
deregularized industries, opening certain industries for trade with China, and having POEs
investing in these firms have aligned their economic interests with KMT (Chang, 2008; Mat-
sumoto, 2002). The firms selected by KMT are generally big business groups that play an
important role in business associations of different sectors (Chang, 2008; Matsumoto, 2002).
CEOs of these firms have organized support groups in their firms/industries and spoken in
campaigns to mobilize support for KMT (Chang, 2008; Tao, 2015).
In the past twenty years since democratization, KMT has combined both programmatic
and clientelistic accountability strategies. Although better democratic quality and more
competitive elections have raised the costs of clientelism, KMT has still largely provided
targeted benefits to key business groups, and mobilized electoral support by establishing an
alliance with key firms and utilizing their influence in professional associations and the indus-
tries. The clientelistic strategy has materialized in the context of less transparent economic
regulatory environment, including the process of liberalizing some sectors and establishing
new institutions for market governance, and the sphere of cross-Taiwan strait trade.13 The
rhetoric used by business leaders in the campaigns for KMT has further strengthened the
party’s right wing image.
13In the Taiwanese Constitutions and laws, the mainland China is not treated as a foreign country. Thus
the opening of trade and investment in any sector with China requires special legislation, which enables the
ruling party opportunities to patronize selected firms when regulating the market.
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5.2 Turkey
In 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) began implementing neo-liberal economic revisions.
The changes paved the way to the rise of new economic forces in the early 1990s. Among
those was a new business group, composed of small and medium sized export-driven Islamic
businessmen, who organized their own business association, the MU¨SIAD14. The rise of an
Islamic business class was related to a growing Islamic presence in party politics. In 1996, the
Islamist Welfare Party (WP) formed the government coalition. The WP and MU¨SIAD had
an ideological affinity on cultural and economic aspects. WP’s clientelistic strategy would
prove to be typical of Islamic parties in Turkish politics. On the one hand, it established
a network of grassroots organizations that maintained ties with small businesses. On the
other hand, it approached the poor to increase its electoral support.
Since 2002, the moderate, Islamic JDP has emerged as the dominant party in Turkish
politics. Programmatically, the party is committed to free markets, privatization, and foreign
investment (Ozbudun, 2006). The party also utilizes RC and PC strategies15. In essence,
one of the keys to the success of JDP is its ability “to create a cross-class coalition between
the rising Muslim bourgeoisie and the poor.”(Zencirci, 2014, 38). In terms of PC, JDP’s
neoliberal welfare regime has allowed party activists and Islamic business to form a network
of charity organizations, and assist the party during its electoral efforts. For example, ev-
idence of distribution of consumer goods prior to elections have surfaced in areas in which
conservative parties have had low electoral support in the past (Bugra and Candas, 2013).
In addition, Eligur (2009) shows that the government had used gifts such as appliances, coal
and food baskets for electoral means. The JDP has also used a variety of state-controlled
14MU¨SI˙AD – Mu¨stakil Sanayici ve I˙s¸adamlar Dernegˇi. The “Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
Association.”
15Indeed, both in terms of private and rent clientelism, the party is ranked the most clientelistic party in
our data. The party is also the most right wing party in Turkey.
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assistance programs to establish its electoral position among the poor (Aytac, 2014). The
party has also used the Mass Housing Development Authority (TOKI) to deliver rents to
business interests. In charge of building 450,000 units of hosing, the TOKI program has been
moved directly under the authority of the Prime Minister by the JDP. This provides con-
struction companies a strong incentive to support the party. In addition, decisions pertaining
to large housing projects have an effect on local economies, as government investments can
stimulate the regional economy. Performing a quantitative analysis of TOKI expenditures,
Marshall, Abdullah and Alper (2015) demonstrate that TOKI is used as a means to enhance
the party’s electoral support. Finally, the construction boom has been used by the JDP to
further the interests of Islamic business groups associated with MU¨SIAD, as construction
companies associated with the Islamic organization and the JDP have been favorably treated
by TOKI (Karatepe, 2013).
The JDP therefore exemplifies a cross-class, bifurcated strategy. The party is able to
establish clientelistic networks with the rising Islamic business class by utilizing the ideolog-
ical/cultural affinity it shares with Islamic entrepreneurs. In addition, the party establishes
itself as a provider of PC goods for low-income voters. In order to increase its PC and RC
clout, the party has taken measures to ensure the politization of massive economic resources
such as TOKI, which provide them with significant resources that can be used as part of its
RC strategy.
6 Data and Measures
We utilize the data provided by the DALP, which is based on an expert survey focusing on
various party characteristics, including the extent to which parties utilize different linkage
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mechanisms. The data covers all polities of at least two million inhabitants with a “minimum
of two rounds of national electoral competition under at least semi-democratic conditions
(Kitschelt, 2013).” For each country, the project contains expert judgements for all politically
relevant parties as of the last elections prior to 2009. Altogether, the survey covers a total
of 508 parties in 88 countries, with broad geographic spread.
In order to distinguish between rent and private clientelism, we construct two dependent
variables. We generate the RC variable by summing experts’ responses for two questions
from the survey (b4 and b5). These questions capture a type of clientelistic exchange that
aims at establishing clientelistic exchanges with clients organized in more formal business
networks, such as employers, unions and business interests, by providing an array of con-
tracts, regulatory codes, and business environments favoring the clients. Specifically, these
questions focus on: (1) Preferential access to government contracts or procurement oppor-
tunities, and (2) Application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies. Our second
dependent variable, PC, is a summation of experts’ responses to three questions (b1-b3).
This type of clientelism includes one-time handouts of gifts, jobs, and preferential access
to material advantages in public policy schemes (e.g. disability pensions, access to public
housing, and access to public health facilities) to private voters.
As for operationalizing parties’ ideology, the DALP survey includes a number of questions
tapping into parties’ ideological positions. Among those are parties’ positions on (1) social
spending on the disadvantaged, (2) state role in governing the economy, (3) public spending,
(4) national identity, and (5) traditional authority, institutions, and customs. To construct
our measure of economic left-right position, we use factor analysis. The results, presented
in Table 3, show that the responses to these questions load onto two distinct dimensions.
Specifically, responses to the first three questions construct an economic ideology dimension.
Since we are interested in the relationship between economic position and clientelism, we
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use the party-level scores derived from this procedure as our measure of parties’ economic
positions.
We highlight three additional variables that play a role in our argument. The first variable
is Strength of Linkages: Business. This is an binary variable, based on the question: “Do the
following parties have strong linkages to business associations and professional associations?”
Second, to gauge market liberalism, we use two variables. The first is Economic Freedom,
provided by the Heritage Foundation. This index is based on measurement of four cate-
gories: (1) Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption), (2) Limited Government
(fiscal freedom, government spending), (3) Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor
freedom, monetary freedom), and (4) Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom,
financial freedom). A country’s overall score is derived by averaging all of these, yielding
a score ranging from of 0 to 100. The other variable used to capture market liberalism is
the Regulatory Quality index. This measure is one of World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators, and aims at capturing incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such as price con-
trols, inadequate bank supervision, and excessive regulation on foreign trade. The measure
is based on 32 existing data sources that report the experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs,
and experts in NGOs and the public sector about relevant concepts. The scores are in the
-2.5 to 2.5 range.
6.1 Additional Variables and Statistical Model
Our statistical models include a number of control variables, which have been shown to
be correlated with clientelism. First, two aspects of democracy co-vary with clientelism,
namely its quality and age (Keefer, 2007; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013). We use Polity2
scores to measure the former, and Gerring, Bond, Barndt and Moreno (2005)’s Democratic
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Table 3: Factor Analysis Results: Left-Right Position
Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Social spending on the disadvantaged 0.902
State role in governing the economy 0.921
Public spending 0.916
National identity 0.965
Traditional authority, institutions, and customs 0.683
Proportion of variation 0.511 0.299
Note: Factors obtained using Varimax rotation.
Stock variable to gauge the accumulation of democratic experience. We also account for the
levels of economic development. The literature has suggested that voters in wealthy societies
might be more difficult to be enticed with particularistic benefits, or that the relationship
is curvilinear. We therefore include also a quadratic term of economic development in the
models.
Political institutions also exert influence over the use of clientelism. Scholars have sug-
gested that multiple electoral mechanisms may affect the propensity to use clientelism, such
as personalist arrangements (Ames, 1999) and specific electoral rules such as SNTV sys-
tems (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1995). Accordingly, our models include variables capturing the
mean district magnitude. In addition, following the literature discussing the relationship
between presidentialism and clientelism (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Ordeshook, 1995), we
use a variable capturing whether a country is a presidential system. Next, based on research
on socio-economic factors and parties’ clientelism (Kolev and Wang, 2014; Thomas, 2011),
our analysis includes two measures of inequality, the GINI coefficient and a between group
inequality measure16, as well as a measure of a country’s reliance on oil exports.
At the party level, our analysis incorporates two variables that gauge parties’ organiza-
16For a detailed description of this variables see Kolev and Wang (2014).
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tional features. The indicator of local notables measures the extent to which parties have
local intermediaries such as neighborhood leaders, local notables, or religious leaders who
operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf. It is assumed that the network of
local intermediaries facilitates the distribution of targeted goods. In addition, selection cen-
tralization captures the degree to which national party leaders control the process of party
candidate selections. It is expected that centralized parties are better able to invest in clien-
telistic strategy (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011). Both variables are taken from the DALP
dataset. Next, since the ability to use clientelistic practices is related to a party’s share
of power in decision-making institutions, we include measures of a party’s vote share and
whether it has had a cabinet minister when the DALP survey was implemented.17.
To test both party and country-level effects, we model parties’ reliance on RC and PC
by utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model containing party and country-level components
(Gelman and Hill, 2007). We incorporate country-level covariates along with responses from
the DALP survey, which are at the party level. Hierarchical models are suitable for capturing
the “causal heterogeneity” (Western, 1998) that is likely to be present in the data, since the
relationship between party level attributes and the dependent variable might differ based
on the country-level characteristics. The description of the basic model and a model with
cross-level interaction is included in Appendix 3.
7 Analysis
We begin our analysis by estimating the statistical relationship between parties’ economic
ideology and their use of rent and private clientelism. Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 present
17Descriptive statistics are listed in the Appendix 2
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the results when rent clientelism is the dependent variable. In Model 1, we include party
level-variables, as well as institutional variables at the country-level, while in Model 2 we
introduce country-level economic and social factors, as well as regional indicators. Before
turning to our variables of interest, we review the coefficients on the possible confounding
variables. The results of Model 1 indicate the democratic stock of a country exerts a negative
effect on RC levels. In addition, in line with previous literature, in Model 1, the results point
to a positive impact of presidentialism and a negative impact of the mean district magnitude
in a country on parties’ RC usage. However, once we introduce economic variables and
regional indicators in Model 2,18 the coefficients on presidentialism and democratic stock
are no longer significant. The effects of these country-level variables on private clientelism
(Models 3 and 4) are similar to the results of Models 1 and 2.
In terms of party-level characteristics, the results presented in the Table are also in line
with previous studies. Specifically, regardless of model specification and types of clientelism,
the results indicate that both parties’ reliance on local notables and centralization of can-
didates’ selection procedures yield a positive effect on clientelism.19 Unsurprisingly, the two
variables capturing political powers (i.e. government membership and vote share) indicate
that larger and governmental parties are more likely to use clientelism.
Moving to the variable of interest, the results indicate that a party’s economic position
matters when it comes to RC usage. Specifically, and as expected in Hypothesis 1, moving
from left to right in terms of economic ideology yields a higher degree of reliance on RC. A
graphical illustration of this result is presented in Figure 1. The figure demonstrates that
moving from the extreme left to right on the economic ideological scale leads to a significant
18We include politico-regional indicators for Advanced Capitalist, Post-Communist Latin American,
African and Asian/Middle East countries. The reference category is Advanced Capitalist group of coun-
tries. Estimates are not reported in the Table.
19We maintained the original coding of these variables in the DALP dataset, and hence the negative
coefficients.
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Table 4: Disaggregating Clientelism
Dependent variable:
rent clientelism private clientelism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 6.645∗∗∗ 8.743 10.397∗∗∗ −7.825
(0.413) (9.605) (0.608) (13.709)
polity2 0.036 0.044 0.029 0.096∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.046) (0.046)
democratic stock −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
presidentialism 0.502∗∗ 0.057 1.098∗∗∗ 0.372
(0.215) (0.229) (0.314) (0.326)
mean district magnitude −0.007∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
between group inequality 8.216∗∗ 9.571∗
(3.635) (5.167)
GINI 0.016 −0.002
(0.016) (0.023)
GDP per capita −0.252 4.783
(2.310) (3.296)
GDP per capita2 −0.012 −0.317∗
(0.132) (0.188)
local notable −0.833∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ −1.268∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.106) (0.159) (0.156)
selection centralization −0.549∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.081) (0.124) (0.118)
government membership 0.306∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.076) (0.076)
vote share 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
right-left position 0.250∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.061 0.053
(0.036) (0.036) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 497, 87 clusters 453, 79 clusters 497, 87 clusters 453, 79 clusters
Log Likelihood -641.656 -553.375 -83.781 -722.035
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,307.312 1,146.750 1,691.561 1,484.070
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,357.815 1,229.068 1,742.065 1,566.815
σˆy 0.68 0.67 1.02 0.99
σˆα 0.86 0.59 1.25 0.83
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Models 2, 4 include regional indicator variables. Country-level variables
at the top of the table.
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increase in the usage of RC tactics, which equals to a full unit or two-third standard deviation
increase (from 4.2 to 5.2) in our measure of RC. In contrast to the significant relationship
between ideology and RC, and as outlined in hypothesis 2, we fail to find a relationship
between economic ideology at the party level and PC, i.e., the effect of ideology on private
clientelism is negligible and indistinguishable from zero.
effect of left−right ideology on rent clientelism
economic ideology
re
nt 
clie
nte
lism
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.4
−2 −1  0  1  2
Note: Predicted values of rent clientelism as a function of left-right economic position. Other variables are at their mean
values.
Figure 1: Predicted Values of Rent Clientelism Across the Ideological Scale
Having established that right wing ideology matters with respect to the use of RC, but
not PC, we now shift our attention to the mechanisms underlying the relationship between
ideology and RC. Recall that in Hypothesis 3 we specify a relationship in which parties’ ties
to business association mediate the relationship between right wing ideology and the use
of RC. In order to test this hypothesis, we include a variable capturing parties’ strength of
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linkages with business associations in the models. The results are presented in Table 5. In the
Table, Model 1 serves as a baseline, which does not include the “business association linkage”
variable. In Models 2 and 3 the variables is introduced. In terms of model specification, in
Model 2 the coefficient for business associations is constant across countries, and in Model 3
we fit a hierarchical model in which the coefficient on that variable is allowed to vary across
countries.
Examination of the results entails comparing Models 2 and 3 with Model 1. This com-
parison reveals that while the inclusion of the mediating variable has a negligible effect on
other coefficients, the magnitude of the coefficient on the right-left position is decreased from
0.25 in Model 1 to 0.176 and 0.156 in Models 2 and 3, respectively (a decrease of 30%-40%).
In addition, the business association linkage has a significant direct effect on the use of RC.
To establish our claim that parties’ ties to business associations mediate the relationship
between ideology and RC usage, we conduct a multi-level mediation analysis, which aims
at investigating whether there are intermediate variables that lie in the causal pathway
between the independent and the dependent variable. A mediating effect is established if
the mediator has significant effects on the dependent variable, and the association between
the independent and the dependent variables is substantially reduced once the mediator
is included. Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis based on the method proposed by
Krull and MacKinnon (2001). Here, the independent variable of interest is parties’ left-right
ideology, the mediator is parties’ ties to business associations, and the dependent variable is
parties’ RC effort. For simplicity, the figure only lists the effects of the main independent
variable on the mediator, the effects of the mediator on the dependent variable, and the direct
effects of the main independent variable on the dependent variable. The results suggest that
right wing parties have more regularized linkages to business associations. In addition, right
wing parties with extensive ties to business associations are more likely to rely on rent
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Table 5: Business Associations and Parties’ Clientelistic Practices
Dependent variable:
rent clientelism
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 8.734 9.061 9.262
(9.605) (9.485) (9.402)
polity2 0.044 0.044 0.048
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
democratic stock −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
presidentialism 0.057 0.061 0.072
(0.229) (0.226) (0.226)
mean district magnitude −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
between group inequality 8.216∗∗ 8.275∗∗ 8.433∗∗
(3.635) (3.586) (3.625)
GINI 0.016 0.015 0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP per capita −0.252 −0.396 −0.495
(2.310) (2.281) (2.263)
GDP per capita2 −0.012 −0.003 0.004
(0.132) (0.130) (0.129)
local notable −0.729∗∗∗ −0.694∗∗∗ −0.681∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.102)
selection centralization −0.463∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.080) (0.078)
government membership 0.252∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049)
vote share 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
left-right position 0.250∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.049) (0.048)
business association linkage 0.342∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.188)
Observations 453, 79 clusters 453, 79 clusters 453, 79 clusters
Log Likelihood -553.375 -551.938 -542.239
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,146.750 1,145.875 1,130.479
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,229.068 1,232.309 1,225.144
σˆy 0.67 0.66 0.60
σˆα 0.59 0.58 0.76
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country-level variables at the top of the table. Model 1 serves as a
benchmark model before including business association linkages. In model 3 the effect of business associations
linkage varies across countries.
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clientetelism appeals. The mediating effect of the business association variable is significant,
as this variable transmits around thirty percent of the total impacts of parties’ ideology on
their levels of RC usage. Along with the results presented in Table 5, these results support
for the contention that a significant part of right wing parties’ reliance on RC is contingent
upon their ties with business associations.
rent 
cleintelism
left-right 
position
business 
association 
linkage
0.21*** 0.35***
0.24***
30% of the total effect of right-wing ideology on club clientelism 
is mediated by parties' ties to business association
Mediation analysis for H 3
Note: Multi-level mediation analysis for hypothesis 3. All covariates included in table 3 are included in the mediation analysis.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Figure 2: Mediation Analysis
The final part of the empirical analysis centers on the contingent effect of the regulatory
environment in a country over the use of RC tactics. Recall that our Hypothesis 4 states that
in liberal regulatory environments, the effect of parties’ linkage with business associations
will be diminished. To test this, we create a cross-level interaction term between business
association linkage (at the party-level) and two variables that capture the regulatory en-
vironment (three-year lagged economic freedom and regulatory quality indicators, both at
the country-level). Table 6 presents the results. First, Models 1 and 3 in the Table include
the regulatory environment variables additively without interactions, and Models 2 and 4
include the relevant interactions. In Model 1, the coefficient on economic freedom does not
reach statistical significance. In Model 2, the coefficient on regulatory quality is statistically
significant and negative, indicating that poor regulatory quality result in higher levels of RC
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use.
More importantly, however, the effects on the interaction terms in Models 2 and 4 are
significant and in the expected direction, indicating that more liberalized environments hin-
der parties’ reliance on business associations as a channel for RC. Figures 3 and 4 display
the interactive effect, specifically, the slope on the business associations linkage variable, as a
function of the moderating regulatory environment variables. Both figures demonstrate that
as the regulatory environment becomes more open and transparent, the ability of parties to
utilize their business associations linkage as a RC distributive mechanisms is reduced20.
20We also conduct robustness checks, including simple OLS models, regression models with clustered
errors, and models with country fixed effects, for the four hypotheses. These robustness check models all
show consistent results.
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Table 6: Economic Environment and Clientelism
Dependent variable:
rent clientelism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 10.373 10.453 9.819 10.611
(9.697) (9.016) (9.819) (9.130)
polity2 0.050 0.061∗ 0.051 0.062∗
(0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033)
democratic stock −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
presidentialism 0.031 −0.009 0.037 0.005
(0.235) (0.218) (0.238) (0.221)
mean district magnitude −0.006∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
between group inequality 7.510∗∗ 7.876∗∗ 7.509∗∗ 8.168∗∗
(3.727) (3.446) (3.771) (3.476)
GINI 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.012
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
GDP per capita −0.675 −1.144 −0.799 −1.250
(2.319) (2.177) (2.348) (2.205)
GDP per capita2 0.016 0.064 0.024 0.072
(0.133) (0.125) (0.134) (0.127)
economic freedom −0.009 0.006
(0.009) (0.010)
regulatory quality −0.772∗∗∗ −0.576∗∗
(0.254) (0.263)
oil export 0.133 −2.104 0.196 −2.155
(1.280) (1.421) (1.291) (1.433)
government membership 0.244∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
vote share 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
right-left position 0.158∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
business association linkage 0.509∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 2.673∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.187) (0.674) (0.205)
local notable −0.678∗∗∗ −0.659∗∗∗ −0.672∗∗∗ −0.672∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
selection centralization −0.469∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
business association linkage×economic freedom −0.030∗∗∗
(0.009)
business association linkage×regulatory quality −0.513∗∗∗
(0.169)
Observations 453, 79 clusters 453, 79 clusters 453, 79 clusters 453, 79 clusters
Log Likelihood -544.446 -537.167 -543.051 -533.974
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,138.891 1,124.334 1,138.101 1,119.948
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,241.789 1,227.231 1,245.114 1,226.961
σˆy 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.68
σˆα 0.79 0.74 0.61 0.56
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country level variables at the top of the table. Models 3, 4 include
cross-level interactions between business associations linkages and economic freedom (3), regulatory quality
(4).
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Figure 3: Moderating Effect of Market Openness
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Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Regulatory Quality
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we offer the first comprehensive and cross-national analysis of the oft-mentioned
relationship between right wing ideology and the use of clientelism. In addition, we explore
the role of business associations as one of the mechanisms through which right wing parties
channel clientelistic goods to voters. Finally, we incorporate the level of economic liberalism
and transparency in a country as a factor that moderates the effect of those associations on
clientelism.
We find that right wing parties are more clientelistic, but only when it comes to using
what we define as rent clientelism, i.e, a type of clientelistic effort that is aimed at groups of
voters organized especially in more formal business networks. We argue that this is because
right wing parties are more likely to offer clientelistic inducements to these groups relative
to left leaning parties, who are limited in their ability to offer clientelistic goods to well-off
groups. This is in contrast to private clientelism, which we find to be a tactic used by all
parties, regardless of their ideological position. Second, our analysis shows that a large degree
(approximately 30%) of the relationship between right wing ideology and rent clientelism is
mediated by parties’ relationship with business associations. Finally, we demonstrate that,
other things being equal, the level of economic liberalism at the country level moderates the
effect of business associations on rent clientelism. Specifically, our results imply that right
wing parties are less able to use their linkage to business associations to provide clientelistic
benefits in economically liberal environment.
The results have a number of implications. First, they answer a set of important ques-
tions in the study of party politics, namely, which parties are better able to use clientelistic
appeals. What type of clientelism are they more likely to pursue? And, what mechanisms
enable or hinder these exchanges between patron and client? Second, the results strongly
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suggest that both conceptually and empirically, it is better to disaggregate parties’ clien-
telistic efforts. In our view, it is evident that efforts such as gifts to private voters, on
the one hand, and application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies, on the
other, are distinct in many aspects (for example, the type of resources needed to employ the
strategy, the targeted groups, and the organizational capacity of the patron). Third, while
scholars have thus far focused on studying ideological and clientelistic appeals separately,
our analysis indicates that there exists a nuanced relationship between parties’ ideology and
clientelism. Fourth, the ability of right wing parties to diversify their appeal –combine ide-
ological with clientelistic strategy–suggests a future line of inquiry, focusing on the trade-off
and the appeal-diversification strategies available for parties. Finally, our findings regarding
the role of political economy in mediating and moderating clientelistic efforts highlight the
importance of incorporating these aspects into analysis on clientelistic strategies.
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Appendix 1: Distinguishing Clientelistic and Program-
matic Politics
While in most cases, the distinction between clientelistic and programmatic linkage is clear
cut,21 when the clientelistic linkage involves expansive benefits to a group of people (e.g.
intervention with bureaucracy to obtain a favor for a firm), the difference is not obvious.
We therefore elaborate on a number of dimensions that serve as criteria for differentiation.
First, clientelistic and programmatic tactics differ in terms of the contingency of exchanges.
By this we mean that clientelistic exchanges generally involve an implicit agreement between
the patron (be it a high level party personnel, or a local party broker), and prospective voters
and that the provision of benefits is conditional on voters’ support.
In clientelism, the group of beneficiaries is much better delineated and defined than in
programmatic exchange. As a result, if the party is able to monitor the voting of its clients,
or when voters are sufficiently committed to the clientelistic relationship, uncertainty levels
regarding the electoral gains for the party are low.22 In contrast, identifiability is low and
uncertainty is high in the case of programmatic linkage. For example, while the implemen-
tation of a progressive tax scheme is likely to improve the economic well-being of middle and
lower income voters, it is difficult to predict with accuracy its effect on their voting calculus.
In addition, clients’ expectations differ across linkage mechanisms. In clientelism, voters
expect the provision of goods with a high degree of certainty, while voters choosing among
policy bundles are less certain about the implementation and effects of policies. Finally,
21For example, a speedy referral to a medical specialist in exchange for a vote compared to endorsing
universal health care an election manifesto.
22This is akin to (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, 13:14) notions of ‘predictability, elasticity, and compe-
tition.’ In other words, the clientelistic benefits provided by the party have a strong impact on the voting
calculus of the recipients, such that absent its provision, the patron can expect to lose their votes with a
high degree of certainty.
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clientelistic and programmatic linkages also differ in terms of transparency. While trans-
parency varies across different clientelistic and programmatic practices, democratic norms
dictate that in general, clientelistic linkage practices are less open to scrutiny than their
programmatic counterparts.
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max SD
variable
right-left position -2.1 -0.73 -0.082 0.0016 0.710 3.10 0.97
rent clientelism 2.0 3.5 5 4.8 6.1 7.90 1.52
private clientelism 3.2 5.5 7.3 7.3 9.1 12 2.25
between group inequality 0 0.002 0.011 0.02 0.029 0.15 0.03
GDP per capita 6.4 8.5 9.3 9.2 10 11 1.05
polity2 -6.0 7 9 7.8 10 10 3.09
democratic stock -350 -190 9.8 90 340 640 311.47
electoral system proportionality 0 1 3 2.2 3 3 0.91
presidentialism 0.0 0 0 0.48 1 1 0.5
mean district magnitude 0 1.9 7.5 19 17 150 34.46
government membership 0 0 0 0.68 1 2 0.77
vote share 0 4.10 8.8 15 23 82 15.72
GINI 25 32 36 39 44 74 9.97
oil export 0 0.006 0.014 0.039 0.030 0.73 0.08
business association linkage 0 0.16 0.46 0.47 0.75 1 0.33
economic freedom 30 54 64 63 75 84 12.89
business friendly 2 26 60 69 110 170 47.46
local notable 1 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.1 3 0.45
selection centralization 1 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.3 4 0.64
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
42
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: A Hierarchical Model of Clientelism
The basic varying intercept hierarchical model we use to test the relationship between right-
left ideology and clientelism practices is the following:
yi ∼ N(α[j]i +
K∑
k=1
βxki, σ
2
y), for i = 1, ..., n (1)
With each βx capturing the effects of party-level covariates (1,. . . ,K) on the dependent
variable. In these models, on average, country-level clientelism is estimated as a linear
function of country-level variables:
αj ∼ N(γ0 +
M∑
k=1
γxmj, σ
2
α), for j = 1, ..., J (2)
With each γx representing the effects of country-level covariates (1,. . . ,M) on the dependent
variable.
Second, we are interested in the degree to which country-level factors affect the association
between party-level variables and clientelism. Specifically, we hypothesize that the effect of
parties’ links with business associations on clientelism is conditional on economic variables
such as the regulatory environment. To test this hypothesis, we use an interaction term in
which the slope of the business association variable varies across levels of economic freedom
and regulatory quality. This cross-level interaction can be written as:
αj
βj
 ∼ N
Γα0 + γα1 economic liberalism
Γβ0 + γ
β
1 economic liberalism
 ,
σ2α ρσασβ
ρσασβ σ
2
β

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Where, Γα0 and Γ
β
0 represent vectors of country and party-level coefficients, respectively. In
addition, the γα1 is the constituent term representing the direct effect of economic liberalism,
and the interactive effect of economic liberalism and business association linkage is captured
by γβ1 .
Appendix 4: Parties’ Ideologies and the Targeted Groups
We use Bayesian hierarchical models to examine the arguments specified in the Parties
Ideology and Types of Clientelistic Tactics section. That is, left wing parties rely mainly on
PC to attract their ‘core’ constituencies (more likely to be poor), while right wing parties
use RC to target their ‘core’ constituencies and PC to buy off low-income voters. The
dependent variables in the analysis are based on the DALP survey question: “If parties
provide preferential benefits in order to receive votes, which of the following groups of voters
do they primarily target? 1) Primarily to its partisan loyalists; 2) Primarily to strategic
voters; 3) Both loyal and strategic voters.” The dependent variables in Table 8 are the
percentages of experts who answered that the party primarily targets one of the three groups.
In addition to parties’ economic ideology as the main independent variable to explore whether
left and right wing parties tend to target different groups of voters, we also control for
other covariates included in the models presented in Table 4. In Table 8, the coefficients on
parties’ left-right position are significant but in opposite directions when we compare Model 1
(targeting loyalists) with Models 2 (targeting both groups of voters) and 3 (targeting strategic
voters). The coefficient on parties’ left-right position in Model 1 is negative, suggesting
that left wing parties tend to target party loyalists as the beneficiaries of their clientelistic
spending; the coefficients in Models 2 and 3 are positive, showing that right wing parties are
more likely to distribute clientelistic benefits to both party loyalists and strategic voters.
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To further examine the types of clientelistic goods utilized by parties in order to attract
different groups of voters, we include interaction terms between parties’ ideological positions
and their RC/PC usages (Table 9). As can be seen in Model 2, the coefficient on the
interaction term between parties’ economic ideology and their RC usage is positive and
significant. This suggests that right wing parties are more likely to rely on RC to target
both their loyalists and strategic voters. Further, in order to explore whether parties deliver
PC to target only loyalists or both groups of voters, we include the interaction term between
parties’ left-right position and their PC effort (Models 3 and 4). The effects of the interaction
terms are found to be significant and in opposite directions, implying that left wing parties
use PC to primarily target their loyalists, while right wing parties deliver PC to both loyalists
and strategic voters.
Overall, the results suggest that left wing parties tend to only utilize PC to attract their
party loyalists, while right wing parties are more likely to spend on both RC and PC to
target both loyalists and strategic voters. broadly, these analyses validate the implications
of the theory, i.e. that left wing parties rely on PC to attract their ‘core’ constituencies,
and right wing parties tend to adopt a two-pronged strategy. A detailed analysis on parties’
choice of target group is left for future research.
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Table 8: Parties’ Ideologies and Targeted Groups
Dependent variable:
targeting targeting targeting
loyalists both strategic voters
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −0.539 1.729∗ −0.233
(1.289) (1.046) (0.925)
polity2 0.003 −0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
democratic stock −0.0001 0.0001 0.00003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
electoral formula proportionality −0.012 0.007 0.005
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
presidentialism −0.003 −0.00004 0.004
(0.038) (0.031) (0.028)
mean district magnitude 0.0002 −0.001∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
between group inequality −0.327 0.836 −0.491
(0.622) (0.509) (0.451)
GINI −0.001 0.003∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per capita 0.235 −0.301 0.077
(0.310) (0.252) (0.223)
GDP per capita2 −0.011 0.016 −0.006
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
local notable −0.063∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.021) (0.019)
selection centralization −0.056∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.021
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014)
government membership 0.018 0.002 −0.020∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
vote share −0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
right-left positions −0.067∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 455 455 455
Log Likelihood 33.462 144.101 198.824
Akaike Inf. Crit. -32.925 -254.202 -363.648
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 37.120 -184.157 -293.603
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 9: Parties’ Ideologies, Clientelism, and Targeted Groups
Dependent variable:
loyalists both loyalists both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −0.803 2.098∗∗ −0.691 2.146∗∗
(1.304) (1.066) (1.295) (1.059)
polity2 0.004 −0.007 0.003 −0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
democratic stock −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
electoral formula proportionality −0.010 0.004 −0.010 0.006
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
presidentialism 0.002 −0.008 −0.001 −0.010
(0.039) (0.032) (0.038) (0.032)
mean district magnitude 0.0001 −0.001 0.0001 −0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
between group inequality −0.219 0.651 −0.298 0.658
(0.635) (0.525) (0.626) (0.519)
GINI −0.001 0.003∗ −0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per capita 0.318 −0.422 0.276 −0.436∗
(0.317) (0.260) (0.316) (0.259)
GDP per capita2 −0.016 0.024 −0.014 0.025
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
local notable −0.073∗∗ −0.040∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.040∗
(0.029) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022)
selection centralization −0.062∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
government membership 0.019 −0.001 0.016 0.001
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
vote share −0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
left-right positions −0.021 −0.018 −0.0001 −0.037
(0.031) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023)
rent clientelism −0.012 0.020∗∗
(0.012) (0.009)
private clientelism −0.002 0.013∗∗
(0.008) (0.006)
rent clientelism × left-right positions −0.010 0.010∗
(0.007) (0.005)
private clientelism × left-right positions −0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 455 455 455 455
Log Likelihood 27.545 140.020 27.810 141.628
Akaike Inf. Crit. -17.091 -242.040 -17.620 -245.257
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 61.195 -163.755 60.666 -166.971
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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